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ABSTRACT 
 
‘Resilience’ is a contested term with varying and ambiguous meaning in governmental, business and 
social discourses. Surveillance is increasingly relied upon as an instrument for resilience, enhancing the 
capability of anticipating, preventing or recovering from adversity, thus preserving the fabric of society 
and the state. However surveillance itself might undesirably erode social freedoms, rights, and other 
public goods. In the present study we focus on the interrelationship of surveillance and resilience. 
Studying the relationships between surveillance and resilience requires not only the theoretical study of 
possible examples but also the exploration and evaluation of the resilient entity’s core properties, 
strategies and tactics and the external observer’s stance towards the entity in question. Furthermore, 
different contexts may exhibit different effects of surveillance on resilience. For example, an increase 
in surveillance by a democratic state may lead to increasing resilience of the state in the face of terrorist 
attacks but may also lead to the decreasing resilience of that society’s ability to exercise democratic 
values. The various models generated by these differing relationships will be explored with relation to 
three examples: the surveillance of international migration, the surveillance of extremist views, and the 
surveillance of digital financial transactions. 
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Surveillance and Resilience: Relationships, Dynamics and Consequences 
 
Introduction 
The threat to privacy posed by surveillance has long been recognised in the academic 
literature,1 and appears greatly intensified in the post-9/11 era of the mass surveillance of 
electronic communications.2 Through a combination of theoretical development and three 
topical case studies, namely  the surveillance of international migration, the surveillance of 
‘extremist’ views, and the surveillance of digital financial transactions, this article explores 
the relationship between surveillance and certain cultural, normative and legal aspects of 
Western liberal democracies that surveillance is often cited as working to protect against 
terrorism, organised crime and other threats. Furthermore, the article argues that the concept 
of resilience is a fruitful way to approach this research question, and that this concept, which 
is today frequently cited in the security domain in the context of combating terrorism and 
major threats to law and order, can be repurposed in order to model the ability of societies to 
withstand the threats posed to democratic values by surveillance itself. While societies may 
exhibit resilience toward surveillance, the article cautions that this can by no means be 
assumed automatically to happen and that democratic societies and their core values may be 
found not to be sufficiently resilient and may instead fail, in the sense that they witness the 
advent of autocratic rule and the abandonment of open democratic politics, rights protections 
for citizens and groups, and judicial independence.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows. We begin by exploring the notion of resilience, and 
then turn to definitions of ‘public goods’. We then introduce three case studies before using 
them to examine the relationships, dynamics and consequences of the interactions between 
surveillance and resilience, and conclude with some reflections on the implications of the 
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foregoing analysis for our understanding of resilience, as well as on the insights the notion of 
resilience can bring to the study of societal responses to surveillance. 
 
‘Resilience’ is a term used in a wide variety of discourses of business, government and 
society.3 Various definitions of the term have been proposed (see for example the works of 
David Chandler and Philippe Bourbeau).4 Resilience may refer either to an existing property 
of a system, or to measures designed to help the system reach the goal of exhibiting such a 
property in the future. For policy-makers (albeit not for critics of the concept; e.g., 
Neocleous5) it is generally regarded as a ‘good thing’, involving the ability of individuals, 
communities, organisations, countries and other entities to ‘bounce back’ following adverse 
attacks or misfortune, or to be able to take precautions against these occurrences. The dangers 
and events may involve war, terrorism, damage to critical infrastructures, public health, or 
other calamities. ‘Resistance’ is a related term, but different in its emphasis, indicating that 
the entity ‘stands up’ to these dangers, perhaps opposing them in a heroic or defiant way, 
although the two terms in question are often used interchangeably in everyday parlance. 
Resistance may however be one of the components of resilience, alongside processes such as 
anticipation, precaution-taking and ‘bouncing back’. It is of positive value for the citizenry to 
be undaunted, plucky, or resourceful in the face of, or following, threats to their existence, 
further development, or cherished ways of life. Governments may encourage resilience among 
the population, providing resources and infrastructures so that communities can act resiliently, 
whether by precaution or remedy. Governments may also gain favour by directly protecting 
their citizens from disasters, including action following adverse events. They may lose favour 
if these expectations are not fulfilled. 
 
 3 
Remedial action following adversity is one thing. It is even better if governments can prevent 
these events from occurring, or can take precautions to mitigate their effects, rather than 
waiting until they happen and then having to respond entirely reactively and unpreparedly. 
Precaution may involve heightened intelligence capabilities effected through the assembling 
of sources of knowledge about things that may come over the horizon. It may also involve 
ways of putting this knowledge to use effectively and efficiently. Some sources of knowledge 
are provided through surveillance systems and techniques applied to domestic or foreign 
populations, or to elements of the natural or human-made environment that may pose threats 
to the systems or societies for which resilience is sought. Surveillance for a variety of 
purposes has become commonplace in many countries. It is typically justified by the declared 
purpose of keeping people safe and nations secure, although these aims are often ambiguous 
and play upon fears that may or may not be justified by the extent of surveillance or of the 
resilience practices that surveillance supports. Surveillance might be deployed by specialist 
agencies, by responsible agents working in threatened entities, or by individuals and 
communities themselves. This deployment is aimed at enhancing the capability of anticipating, 
preventing or recovering from adversity, thus preserving and strengthening the fabric of 
society and the state. Noteworthy here is the way in which national security strategies espouse 
the rhetoric and promote techniques of resilience and surveillance in dealing with perceived 
terrorism threats at different levels of scale, as Coaffee and Fussey point out,6 and as we show 
below in a case-study of countering ‘extremism’ in the UK. Although the cases described in 
this article illustrate this point en passant, their main thrust is to explore the infrequently 
visited terrain of resilience vis-à-vis surveillance itself. 
 
Surveillance itself – paradoxically – may also undesirably erode the very rights, social 
freedoms and other ‘public goods’ that are among the values that the state’s resilience 
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measures aim to preserve or restore.7 The reason that this is properly a paradox, as opposed to 
the common claim that rights and security need to be ‘balanced’ and exist in a zero-sum game 
between the two, is that surveillance is often regarded as a tool to preserve democratic values 
yet at the same time is eroding the very same values (although the latter effect is much less 
advertised). As we explain further in the next section, we use the term ‘public goods’ in the 
sense of ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’ rather than in the more familiar economic sense 
of goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Following Loader and Walker, 8  we 
sometimes append the adjective ‘constitutive’ to ‘public goods’ to indicate that we are 
concerned with the core qualities of (western) societies, including rights, freedoms and 
liberties that might be under threat from surveillance. Thus constitutive public goods are 
societal goods seen as integral and essential elements of society. Their erosion might be an 
unwanted side effect of resilience strategies or tactics in liberal democratic countries, but in 
some countries with authoritarian regimes, resilience and the surveillance practices that assist 
it are deliberately undertaken in order to maintain the regime in power and protect it from 
those who would seek to topple it. Undermining public goods is part of such strategies in 
those regimes, or at least it is easily condoned as a by-product of surveillance. Even 
democratic societies use surveillance in the service of the state and society against threats, and 
especially in nervous or paranoid times it might reach further into the lives of people, or 
certain kinds of people, than liberal democracy would wish. In all kinds of political systems, 
the public good of security or safety, as avowed by those in power, takes pride of place in the 
face of threats, albeit with very different political implications and resonances throughout 
society, and with very different rationales, aims, limits, and problems of legitimacy.  
 
In a previous article we surveyed the underlying conceptual and theoretical groundwork for 
the general idea and practice of resilience, reaching across to elements of general systems and 
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cybernetic models to highlight important points and concepts that would be useful in the study 
of resilience, and developed a number of diagrams to explore what happens in the various 
possible interactions between threats and responses or non-responses and to sketch the phases 
or stages through which resilience passes.9 Building upon a diagram of a general model of 
resilience (Figure 1), we develop a model of resilience taking into account ‘public goods’, as 
is illustrated in two diagrams reproduced below (Figures 2 and 3), respectively illustrating 
resilience and resistance. Put simply, resilience involves recuperation from, or prevention of, 
adverse events; resistance involves opposing them when they present themselves. The 
processes involved in each may overlap rather than representing wholly different stances. 
 
In this article, then, our use of the concept of resilience stands in contrast to its two main prior 
uses in policy or academic literature. These three possible applications of the concept of 
resilience are summarised in Table 1. First, and as noted above, one of the main ways in 
which ‘resilience’ is referred to in policy terms is in terms of a desirable strategy or goal in 
reference to a particular entity such as individual, group or society. Second and conversely 
however, an undesirable entity  – for example, an authoritarian regime that violates liberties 
and the rule of law – may be seen to exhibit ‘resilience’ and persistence, including where this 
second entity is the target of the first. In relation to surveillance and security, for example, a 
government may introduce a counter-terrorism strategy invoking elements of ‘resilience’ 
(such as preparedness, contingency strategies, learning from mistakes made); but terrorist 
groups may also be described as exhibiting ‘resilience’ to detection, surveillance or disruption 
by the security forces. Whilst we share the concerns of some critics of resilience strategies as 
to the possible negative consequences of these strategies, in this article we develop further our 
previous argument namely that, setting aside for one moment the uses to which resilience may 
be put, the concept of resilience has wider potential analytic utility. In both our previous work 
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and here, the way in which we have applied the concept of resilience is different, namely that 
we argue that in addition to applying the concept to societal entities such as individuals, 
groups, institutions societies or regions, we can also meaningfully apply it to abstract 
concepts found in political theory and other disciplines such as ‘democratic values’. 
Specifically, we suggest that this novel approach can be useful to consider whether a 
particular public good, such as freedom or expression or freedom of movement, will prove 
‘resilient’ in the face of adverse circumstances – including (perhaps ironically) ‘resilience’ 
measures that may have been introduced in the name of protecting society from attack. The 
distinctions between these three different applications of the concept of resilience are 
illustrated in the table below, in which our primary focus is with the third of these: 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here]  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
 
Whereas much of the literature on resilience focuses either on the level of society as a whole 
or on specific policies or strategies, in this article we argue that it is important both to identify 
the values that resilience strategies are seeking to protect, and that since societies value 
various kinds of public good – as suggested above, with reference to security – it is necessary 
to make such discriminations and to bring them into the analysis of resilience. This is because 
they vary in their resonance within populations, and because there are tensions among them 
that may lead to conflicts; for example, between security and liberty or privacy. Moreover, 
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since societies are often composed of a plurality of communities and interest groups, it is 
important to develop a model that acknowledges the values or resilience of certain specific 
groups rather than consider them exclusively at the level of society as a whole.  
 
In addition, it could be the case that one public good or value can be regarded as resilient 
while another one is eroding, making it difficult to apply the general label of ‘resilient’ to the 
society as a whole. This could occur where, for example, the principle of democratic 
participation is resilient in the face of autocratic threats but the Rule of Law declines in its 
salience, leaving minorities less well able to ‘bounce back’ from such attrition. Such 
conditions of situation- or context-dependency, even within the same society, have not been 
studied extensively. We contend that these analytical gaps are especially necessary to fill in 
the context of surveillance, given the way in which the latter affects the range of public goods 
that are constitutive of a liberal democratic society and polity and given the dramatic increase 
in recent years of the surveillance technologies, powers and capabilities of nation states. We 
continue with a discussion of our use of the term ‘public goods’. 
 
Defining Constitutive Public Goods  
Resilience is a value-neutral notion, and ‘bad’ systems (which are antithetical to our 
worldview or our moral conviction, or are simply deficient or imperfect) may also be resilient. 
However, in relation to a discussion of the wider impact of surveillance on liberal western 
societies and constitutional democracies, the reference state of a social system can be defined 
with regard to its valued public goods. In order to elaborate our theoretical analysis in the 
intersection of surveillance and resilience, and to explore further our theses in real-life 
examples, we need to examine in greater detail the reference state – in our case the public 
goods, including the constitutive public goods – to explore and assess different possible 
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definitions of ‘public goods’, and to investigate which of these goods are resilient towards 
which impacts, and how surveillance interferes with such characteristics. 
 
Authors who investigate public goods in an extended sense, or separated from their original 
economic meaning, tend to exemplify some of these goods (such as clean air or national 
security), emphasising their non-rivalrous and non-excludable character, however, without 
providing a full list of such goods. Kallhoff does however attempt to construct a coherent 
system of public goods, incorporating both their economic and non-economic forms. She 
identifies seven regimes of goods: inner and outer security, infrastructures, education and 
science, environmental goods, public spaces, cultural goods, and institutions of care. 10 
However, it is worth noting that privacy – a public good we tend to accept as a constitutive 
public good in western liberal societies – is not mentioned in any of the seven categories, nor 
is the resilience of public goods. Raab notes that privacy as a public good, or social value, is 
recognised by a number of authors and is gaining ground in the discourse and practice of 
information and other forms privacy, and – as we claim later – it may also be the case that 
privacy and security bear a close resemblance.11 
 
Several theorists attempt to define a core set of public goods the existence of which are of 
crucial importance in a western liberal society. From a universal ethical aspect, Kallhoff 
follows Nussbaum's notion of ‘central public goods’, which is based on the people's ‘central 
functional capabilities’.12 However, conceived this way, these goods – partly because of their 
universalist approach, partly because of their level of abstraction – are not suitable for using 
in our specific field of research, the intersection of surveillance and resilience in the context 
of political and societal systems. From a different approach, Rawls, in his (revised) classic 
work, defines the list of ‘primary goods’ as follows: “the chief primary goods at the 
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disposition of society are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth”13 and 
calls them ‘social primary goods’. In addition, he mentions examples of ‘natural primary 
goods’ (health and vigour, intelligence and imagination) the possession of which is influenced 
by the former type of primary goods but which are not directly under their control. 
 
Others analyse the public goods of certain specific fields: open source software is a central 
example of Digital Public Goods;14 Digital Commons is an open access repository where 
“institutions can collect, preserve and make visible all of their intellectual output” to the 
public;15 Creative Commons16 offers the free use of intellectual property to anyone, within the 
limits defined by the creators. When introducing the category of ‘constitutive public goods’, 
Loader and Walker do not attempt to define its exact extent and content. In their work, it is 
not the system of constitutive public goods that is of primary importance but security in a 
broad sense, which the authors define as a global public good.17 
 
For several reasons, it is difficult to compose a comprehensive inventory of public goods. The 
totality of such goods presupposes the existence of an ideal societal system, but actual 
societies are imperfect and do not contain all necessary elements with the same weight.18 
Some constitutive public goods are societally-related notions describing interrelationships 
between the members and groups of society, such as trust, respect, solidarity and mutual 
tolerance, freedom, personal autonomy; at a different level of abstraction, others consist of 
rules and institutions designed to ensure the prevailing of the former, such as constitutionality, 
rule of law, democratic institutions, laws guaranteeing rights and freedoms, checks and 
balances, etc. The existence or deficiency of the latter goods is easier to judge than that of the 
‘societal’ public goods; therefore there is a temptation for researchers to evaluate the 
compliance of a society with western liberal ideals solely on the basis of the legal or 
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institutional forms of public goods. Moreover, if we compare existing societies to the ideal, it 
is also difficult to judge from the aspect of resilience whether the starting reference point itself 
is empirically compliant with the ideal, or is aspirational. Similarly, it is hard to define the 
limits of adverse impacts: up to which point can a system still be regarded as ‘western-
liberal’?; what is the required level of its resilience?; and on which constitutive public goods 
can it be measured?19 At the level of the society as a whole, surveillance may strongly erode 
certain constitutive public goods, while others suffer only a minor erosion; and some 
constitutive public goods – security for example – can even gain strength as a result of 
surveillance. 
 
Our earlier article touched on the applicability of general systems theory to human affairs, and 
pointed up the interesting but difficult question of when changes in a system can be construed 
as the change of the system into something different. In terms of public goods, when does the 
erosion of specific public goods, or of an aggregate, have a lasting adverse effect that leads to 
a loss of resilience and thus the fundamental change of the whole system? For example, 
considering the extensive and intensive collection and analysis of data, including personal 
data in contemporary society (‘datafication’)20 (insert reference for this term?), some would 
argue that the predictive analysis of personal data deprives a significant part of the political 
and economic community of free choice or of developing and satisfying their demands. This 
is because the ‘digital shadow’ or ‘digital footprints’ do not only follow the person but 
virtually precede her, thus an act of ostensibly autonomous choice is but a pre-constructed 
frame in which we act according to the expected patterns. Can we say that in this situation the 
realisation of personal autonomy as a constitutive public good fell below the minimum level, 
and thus the system does not live up to the ideals of a western liberal society?21 
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Another possibility is that one (or some) public goods increase while another (or others) 
decrease. If in a society security in a general sense is increasing, due to extensive surveillance 
and privacy and personal autonomy are decreasing, can we speak about ‘balancing’?22 Is such 
a society western-liberal in the same way as it was before change? According to numerous 
authorities on surveillance studies, the answer is no,23 although they do not define exact 
borderlines of change either. In addition, western liberal democracies, despite their common 
elements, came into existence on the soil of different cultural, societal and political traditions, 
in which the roles and composition of individual constitutive public goods are also different. 
Assessment as to whether significant social change has taken place may depend heavily on 
public opinion and belief, and on the behaviour that follows from them; or on a careful 
analysis of the functional possibilities for society that are either closed down or opened up as 
a result of the rise or fall of certain public goods. 
 
If we investigate not only ‘traditional’ democracies but also ‘new’ democracies – that is, 
countries recently freed from their dictatorial political systems, for example countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – then we observe that importing formal frameworks, such 
as legal and institutional systems, does not necessarily also entail the creation of public goods 
such as trust or solidarity. In these ‘different democratic contexts’ it is even more problematic 
to define the necessary level of resilience. If in these countries surveillance, for example, 
serves to maintain the operation of the welfare state, are we more tolerant of its use in the 
post-transition democracies of CEE than of its use in traditional democracies of the West? 
 
To add a further complexity, societal systems are far from being static, and are constantly 
changing in interaction with economic and political systems: which state of the society shall 
we take as a starting point or reference? If we optimistically suppose that the totality of public 
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goods or certain elements thereof are steadily improving in society over time, rather than 
being constant as the red horizontal line in Figure 2 (above) implies, and are in fact more akin 
to the steady societal development depicted in Figure 1, then we can compare the adverse 
impacts and the resilience of the system to a virtual upward slope. Present-day societies, 
however, show signs of moving away from western liberal ideals, both in traditional and new 
democracies. Greskovits analyses the two most visible elements of these changes at the 
institutional level, ‘hollowing out’ and ‘backsliding’ (that is, citizens lose their interest in 
participating in democratic actions, and governments revert to semi-authoritarian practices) in 
post-transition CEE countries. According to his analysis, these countries show a varying level 
of resilience in terms of the stability of their democratic institutional practices and trust in 
these institutions.24 Székely identifies an almost unavoidable virtual low tide of rights and 
freedoms in post-transitional societies after the initial euphoria of the political changes.25 
 
But even if we are unable to define the full extent of constitutive public goods and the 
expected level of their realisation, we can attempt to localise their absence or deficiency. If we 
are witnessing the erosion of an existing western-type liberal political and social system, 
either in the form of an increasing distance from the ideals, or as a deficient level of 
resilience, then we can try to identify the point at which the system becomes anti-democratic 
or authoritarian. Partly following a formal logic in setting up a virtual scale on the two ends of 
which democracy and autocracy are denoted, Kis defines two types of political system in the 
middle range of the scale: deficient democracies and endangered democracies. A central 
question in his study is whether the interactions and interrelationships between the subsystems 
of democracies lead in the direction of stabilisation or in the direction of destabilisation of the 
whole system.26 Nevertheless, he analyses only those elements of constitutive public goods 
that relate to the legal and institutional framework of a liberal democratic system.27 We can 
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conclude therefore that when studying the development or erosion of public goods and their 
realisation, as well as evaluating their resilience, we can observe and define their trends in 
social and political processes and their impacts, rather than their absolute breaking points. 
 
There is a further element of complexity: the homogeneity or heterogeneity of a society. In 
the foregoing, we considered the social system as a single unit (although we noted above the 
plurality of communities and interest groups in society). We cannot here examine in great 
detail the various social and cultural segments of society in terms of the constitutive public 
goods that will supposedly have a different composition and importance in each of these 
segments. We regard western liberal societies as fundamentally open and multicultural, even 
if multiculturalism is not necessarily manifest within the geographical and historical context 
of a given society. Segments of a society composed of significant ethnic groups or cultural 
minorities may have different public goods or different priorities among these goods. 
However, multiculturalism itself, or rather the acceptance of minorities by the majority, and 
the acceptance of diversity by members of minority groups, can be regarded as a public good 
at the level of the whole society. Kymlicka distinguishes neoliberal multiculturalism and 
multicultural nationalism: he regards the former as inclusive but not-accepting, and the latter 
as an organic compound of solidarity and multiculturalism. In the latter social formation, it is 
not the social contribution of the diverse social groups to the whole of society that justifies 
their place and order: their mere existence is a contribution to the wider society or nationhood. 
According to this view, diverse multicultural societies also have constitutive public goods the 
existence and realisation of which are important to every constituent group in society, even if 
certain individuals or groups do not perceive this, or are preoccupied with fighting for their 
own partial interests. 
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If the social and political systems – either diverse multicultural ones or, as Kymlicka puts it, 
welfare chauvinist ones 28  – suffer strong impacts (stresses and shocks) that change the 
reference point of resilience, then conflicts arise both in the system of public goods and 
among the constituent groups in society. The recent European migration crisis clearly 
represents such stresses and shocks. When enlisting and evaluating the potential responses to 
these, we need to distinguish universal humanitarian obligations from the realisation of public 
goods in society, or more precisely, the migrants’ contribution to strengthening or degrading 
these public goods. In a subsequent section we will analyse the problems posed by migration 
in the context of surveillance.  
 
Case Studies  
We believe that the effects of surveillance upon resilience are best understood in specific 
cases, against a background of a general framework for the study of resilience that we 
outlined earlier. We have chosen three such cases for further analysis here. The three cases, of 
contemporary relevance, have been chosen as contrasting examples of the intensification of 
surveillance at the level of states and international activity, and as sites in which the resilience 
of those subjected to surveillance is severely challenged. The cases are the surveillance of 
international migration, the surveillance of ‘extremist’ views, and the surveillance of digital 
financial transactions. 
 
These cases are offered as examples that conveniently illustrate important aspects of the 
overall analysis, rather than as tests of any theories or hypotheses. As explained below, the 
cases represent different but related facets of anticipatory or coping surveillance activities by 
states and international actors in dealing with perceived threats to national and international 
security and related public goods. The three cases have been selected firstly because all 
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potentially or actually affect the public goods, including human rights, of people as they live 
their daily lives, often placing them under suspicion in ways that reverse the presumption of 
innocence, and secondly because each helps identify the various different sectors and actors at 
play that could be said to be resilient (or not resilient). The subject matter of each case is not 
wholly discrete. To a large degree, each has gained impetus as a facet of the governmental 
and inter-governmental response to the widespread fear of, and expansion of, terrorist attacks 
on societies that are constituted by liberal values and public goods of the kind being 
considered here. For the moment, let us dwell on terrorism, although it is not the only 
surveillance-related show in town. There has been a great deal of academic and policy 
commentary on contemporary counter-terrorism policies and practices in Western societies 
(here used as a shorthand term for liberal democracies) since the outbreak of terrorist attacks 
in a number of countries in the years since 2001. Much attention has been paid to several 
phenomena that are considered by many policy-makers and observers as generators of 
terrorist threats to the values and public goods of these societies. The ubiquity of 
communications through the internet and associated technologies potentially affords terror 
groups the ability to conspire, co-ordinate, and finance their activities in new ways. And the 
recent mass movements of populations from centres of war and disruption – countries which 
are believed to harbour protagonists of ‘extremism’ – into many Western societies who feel 
overwhelmed by sheer numbers of incomers, among whom might be potential terrorists, has 
served to focus on the migratory process as an important site for deploying surveillance.  
 
In these cases, among the aspects that it can useful to examine are:  
• the relationships involved in surveillance and in resilience in the face of it. Here we 
are referring to the relationships between the various different participants or actors, 
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because action and reaction is both pluralistic and differentially distributed across 
society in regard to perceptions, initiatives and responses.   
• the dynamics of the processes of surveillance-and-resilience. As our model indicates, 
these phenomena move through time, and it is important to pay attention to their 
sequencing in order to understand and assess the activities in greater depth.  
• the consequences of surveillance for the specific public goods and societal values at 
stake in each case. This follows from the perception of surveillance as a public issue 
because of its potential effects on social and political life, seen in terms of the multiple 
rights, values, and qualities held to be desirable and defining properties of liberal 
democracy.  
 
Investigating these aspects is likely to provide a large number of insights into both the nature 
of contemporary surveillance and the repertoire of resilience strategies available to the 
societies that are subjected to it.  
 
The surveillance of international migration  
The recent European migration crisis or refugee crisis29 is a specific research area in the 
intersection of surveillance and resilience. It is the phenomenon in which masses of people 
appeared at the external borders of the EU and its neighbouring countries with the aim of 
receiving asylum and residence permits in these countries – a process which has been 
occurring for long years but received adequate political and media attention only since 2015. 
One naturally needs to distinguish this sort of mass movement of people and crossing of 
national borders from the realisation of a fundamental principle of the European Union – the 
free movement of goods and people – from the practice of studying and working abroad, an 
opportunity open to all EU citizens, and also from tourism, which involves the flow of non-
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EU nationals within the EU under controlled circumstances. In the migration case, foreign 
nationals, stateless individuals, and, in most cases, non-identified individuals enter the 
territory of European countries under hardly controllable circumstances. Their mass 
appearance triggers a range of humanitarian, policing, religious, ideological, political, 
security, as well as economic and cultural conflicts in the receiving countries. 
 
For security and policing reasons, it is a natural demand of the host countries to collect and 
analyse information about the size of the actual and foreseeable waves of refugees and the 
individuals who enter the territory of the country. The national authorities also need to collect 
information about these people’s humanitarian needs and the extent of their fulfilment, as well 
as about the group and individual movement of refugees within the territory of the country for 
various reasons. The surveillance of refugees can be classified into two main categories: (a) 
group or mass surveillance30 and (b) individual surveillance.31 In the first category the subject 
of surveillance is the groups or masses of refugees, their general composition (for example the 
proportion of women and children) and their physical movement (for example heading 
towards a national border or occupying trains), without knowing the individual identity of 
their members. In the second category the subject of surveillance is the individual, that is, the 
identified or identifiable persons regarded as refugees. 
 
From the recent history of the refugee crisis it can be established that the flow of refugees 
found the receiving countries largely unprepared, and this led to controversial measures taken 
by the countries concerned and the lack of EU-level political consensus.32 The unpreparedness 
and the resulting humanitarian crisis – in particular, the limits of mobilisable human and 
technical resources – led to a situation in which group/mass surveillance worked relatively 
effectively (partly due to reports and forecasts prepared by secret services and law 
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enforcement agencies), while in the first period individual surveillance – including the 
identification of individuals – was deficient. In the following we will focus on individual 
surveillance, identifying the range of stakeholders, their interests and activities in connection 
with surveillance, the temporal changes in these areas, and the foreseeable consequences. 
 
The main stakeholders in the individual surveillance of refugees are the refugees themselves; 
their relatives inside or outside of the target country; the authorities and their local specialised 
branch offices in refugee camps, together with their personnel, policemen and military 
servicemen; civil liberties and humanitarian aid organisations; human traffickers; and the 
general population of the country concerned. The interests and attitudes of the refugees are 
changing in line with the information they receive from their acquaintances and relatives 
through informal channels, and the information government officials and the official (and 
unofficial) media are spreading. Beyond achieving physical survival, the majority of refugees 
regard the Balkan and CEE countries as transit routes to Western Europe and Scandinavia as 
‘target countries’. Those who originally planned to apply for asylum in these transit countries 
first consented to staying in government- controlled refugee camps where they had been 
properly registered. After having experienced the low level of hospitality of the authorities, 
the unforeseeable length of waiting for the judicial process and the high proportion of 
expulsion orders, several disturbances took place in the refugee camps, some of which 
resulted in the escape of groups of refugees. This, together with the uncontrollable inflow of 
new refugees, provoked the governments of the transit countries to set aside the requirements 
of registering people, and instead, urged the masses of unregistered refugees to continue their 
journey to West European countries and leave the territory of the transit countries as soon as 
possible. Later, observing the demands of the target countries (and also complying with the 
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intergovernmental law enforcement agreements in force) registration has become more 
frequent and organised.  
 
In the refugees’ actions, tactics and strategies both resistance and resilience can be identified. 
Although the similarities, differences and overlaps of resistance and resilience can be 
conceptually debated,33 breaking through closed national borders, occupying trains, fighting 
with the police can be regarded as manifestations of group resistance, and individuals’ 
escaping from refugee camps are an example of individual resistance. However, in the 
perspective of our research, more interesting are the signs of resilience, both in the economic 
and cultural sense and in connection with surveillance. In the latter case identifiability and 
traceability are two sister conditions, and according to interviews with refugees, as well as 
reports of humanitarian aid organisations – such as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee34 – and 
activists, these two conditions are connected in the refugees' minds as well.  
 
Those refugees who were hoping to receive asylum arrived with proper identification 
documents and submitted these documents to the authorities. The majority of those arriving in 
subsequent waves, however – as a result of receiving insider information from the refugee 
camps, as well as learning the propaganda of the governments of certain countries – destroyed 
and discarded their documents in order to conceal their real identity and make their 
traceability more difficult. 35  It should also be noted that a proportion of the Syrian ID 
documents carried by the refugees are reportedly forged.36. Many refugees also discard their 
smartphones before crossing European borders because smartphones contain a host of 
identification data relating to both its owner and his connections. However, mobile phones, 
and smartphones in particular, are sometimes indispensable communication and navigation 
tools for the refugees; therefore they tend to re-use mobile phones discarded by others or 
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change the SIM cards. The improvised nature of such practices can be seen as examples of the 
resilience and resourcefulness of people who are determined to succeed. 
 
The authorities of the receiving (and partly the transit) countries attempt to identify and 
register the refugees arriving at their territory. Because of the lack or dubious authenticity of 
the ID documents, (forced) fingerprinting has become a popular way of registering people.37 
However, refugees tend to avoid being fingerprinted in transit countries and want to be 
registered only in their target countries.38 In September 2015 the Czech police started to mark 
refugees arriving at railway stations with numbers written on their hands and arms with 
permanent ink.39 Human rights advocates and Jewish groups expressed outrage, saying that 
this practice summoned memories of the Nazi era, 40  and a few days later the Czech 
government had to abandon this practice.  
 
We need to distinguish here the general humanitarian aid, which is due to anyone in need, 
even without identification and registration, and the procedure of applying for refugee status 
that evidently necessitates the identification and registration of the applicants. Even the 
demand to avoid multiple claims for humanitarian aid by the same person or to detect 
repeated attempts of expelled persons to re-enter the country does not necessarily require 
registration: biometric data such as fingerprints or iris scans can serve as ‘anonymous’ 
identifiers that the data subject has to produce in each case when applying for humanitarian 
aid or entering the country.41 The identification of the refugees and their interests in revealing, 
concealing or forging their identity is a complex issue. Depending on whether they deem it 
advantageous or disadvantageous, or whether they know (or think) that revealing their real 
identity may pose serious risks such as detention or expulsion, refugees change their attitudes 
and willingness to identify themselves under real or forged identities. A significant group of 
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refugees, for example those coming from Somalia or Afghanistan, have never had proper 
identification documents, or if they manage to buy such (forged) documents, authorities in the 
target countries do not regard these documents as credible and acceptable.42 Some refugees do 
not even know their own citizenship, as was the case with a former taxi driver who used to 
drive between Syria and Iraq, and who was arrested and interrogated in Hungary.43 
 
Since Syrian origin is generally regarded as an advantage, refugees often declare themselves 
Syrian, even if they do not speak the language of that country. Belonging to a family that has 
already received asylum in Western countries or permission to travel to these countries is also 
an advantage, so several refugees declare themselves belonging to such a ‘safe’ family, even 
if there is no relationship. 44  Being a minor can prevent the expulsion of refugees who 
otherwise are unable to prove their refugee status. Without proper identification documents 
authorities can only determine a probable age range, for example 16-19 or 18-23 years of age. 
Naturally, young refugees declare themselves underage; however, authorities in transit 
countries tend to take the middle value of the determined age range and not the value that 
would be the most advantageous for the person concerned. Other elements of a person's 
declared identity, such as being a homosexual, an opposition activist, or member of a minority 
religious community – if such identities are persecuted in the supposed home country – are 
even more difficult to check.45 
 
Despite many controversies, human traffickers and refugees have certain common interests 
and common risks; therefore the traffickers' advice (or demands) are taken seriously by the 
refugees. In the recent period, traffickers working in the CEE area have encouraged refugees 
to discard their ID documents (or simply collected the documents from their clients) and 
suggest that they avoid being fingerprinted, thus also reducing their own risks if arrested. On 
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the other hand, however, human traffickers have vested interests in identifying, and keeping 
identified, refugees and their families, either in the country of origin or in a target country. 
Refugees typically become indebted to organised human-trafficking networks and have to pay 
their debts for many years; thus stable identification methods, such as registered mobile 
phones or SIM cards, are necessary for maintaining a verifiable connection. 
 
The interests and policies of the transit and target countries are also changing. Hungary is a 
striking example in Europe: the ruling political regime tries everything to avoid the 
accommodation of refugees,46 and therefore has sent large groups of refugees through the 
country as soon as possible in order to have them leave Hungary without identification and 
registration. This coincided with the interests of the refugees themselves, who tried not to be 
identified and registered in the transit countries. Thus we can regard this situation as an 
unspoken collusion between the authorities and the refugees. We can also regard this situation 
as a resilient action of a transit country, at least at the level of political rhetoric, and this may 
shed light on significant differences in the composition and realisability of constitutive public 
goods in countries of the CEE region. 
 
In the course of the escalation of the refugee crisis, the European countries concerned have 
significantly enhanced the technical and human conditions of identifying and registering 
refugees, increased the amount of mobilisable resources, as well as enhanced the level of co-
operation among the law enforcement agencies of the countries concerned. Policemen started 
to collect discarded passports and smartphones, analyse the available information, enter the 
data into computer systems and share the digitised information with their counterparts in other 
countries. 47  Interpreters speaking languages of the refugees have been employed at 
registration points, frequently refugees themselves who already obtained residency permit in 
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the host countries. The consequence of these developments is that ‘physical’ refugees 
increasingly become, as Jacobsen puts it,48 ‘digital refugees’, the rights, opportunities and 
future life circumstances of whom depend on the data entered in computerised registration 
systems and the data collected about them through surveillance, including dataveillance. 
Function creep is an evident risk of these registration systems: the data about refugees can 
easily be shared with other data controllers, thus increasing the risk of discriminatory social 
sorting. Such intentions are understandable from the interests and views of the authorities and 
local population of the host countries, but can seriously impede the integration of refugees 
into the society and the realisation of their individual- and group-level cultural autonomy. 
Thus, it is apparent that the refugees prove to be resilient not only in terms of their physical 
and economic survival but also in preserving their communication skills and provable 
identity. However, when they deem their identification, registration, surveillance and tracking 
disadvantageous, they show signs of resilience towards such practices as well.  
 
This case study shows that the refugees prove to be resilient not only in terms of their 
physical and economic survival but also in preserving their communication skills and 
provable identity. However, when they deem their identification, registration, surveillance and 
tracking disadvantageous, they show signs of resilience towards such practices as well. 
 
Paradoxically, in practical terms, closer surveillance of migrants and migration may be 
accompanied by an increase in organised criminals’ involvement in human trafficking as they 
seek to take advantage of migrants’ desire to enter safe or prosperous countries at any cost. 
Such trafficking may be corrosive of society for the same reasons that organised crime is 
confronted by agencies of law enforcement. A further paradox may be seen in the Hungarian 
state’s acting on its incentive not to exercise surveillance of migrants by engaging, instead, in 
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dubious procedures for dealing with them in order to avoid their claims for asylum.  
 
In conclusion, we observe that the surveillance of migrants and migration may or may not 
bolster national security, but in either case the process risks the negative consequence of 
diminishing the civility between citizens characteristic of an open society by creating an 
environment in which mutual suspicion is the norm. In addition, surveillance of migrants can 
be seen as part of a process of ‘social sorting’,49 arbitrating their right to enter or remain in a 
country. Moreover, the intensive surveillance of migrants demeans their human dignity 
because it objectifies and implicitly places them under suspicion. In all, the surveillance of 
migration is part of a process whereby the problem is constituted as one of the security of the 
country or region concerned. However desirable this may be domestically, it displaces 
domestic insecurity onto migrants, with indifference to their suffering. In the process, it also 
fails to address the wider causes of migration. Lastly, the concept and practice of asylum, or 
in its institutionalised form, the right to asylum, can be regarded as being in the public good 
itself. It reinforces social cohesion, it is based on reciprocity but does not expect immediate 
profit, and it is a sort of moral investment of the community. If surveillance is used as an 
instrument to decrease or avoid the provision of asylum for those in need, this clearly erodes a 
public good. As was noted at the end of section 2, a notable feature of the migration case 
study is that it points up the relationship between the constitutive public goods in a particular 
society, and the wider universal/humanitarian public goods. 
 
The surveillance within UK education of ‘extremist’ views 
Within the UK a key driver of its current over-arching counter-terrorism strategy can be 
traced to the shocking events in London in July 2005 when four British Muslim men travelled 
from the north of England to the capital and detonated four suicide bombs on public transport, 
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killing fifty-two victims along with the bombers and injuring over 700 others. While the UK 
had anticipated a possible terror attack following the 9/11 attacks of 2001 and Madrid train 
bombings of 2004, what does not seem to have been foreseen by the country’s intelligence 
agencies was that three of the perpetrators would be British-born.  There was later a series of 
inquiries into possible intelligence failings by the security services,50 which recognised that 
there was insufficient resourcing for and focus on Islamist extremism within the UK itself, 
and that while there may have been direction, training or support for the bombers from 
overseas, there remained the possibility that some British Muslims were being ‘radicalised’ in 
local communities within the UK. 
 
The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy is called ‘CONTEST’ and comprises four different 
‘work streams’ or component strategies, namely ‘Prevent’, ‘Pursue’, ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’.51 
The strategy initially dates from 2003: after 9/11 but before the London bombings. In 2006 a 
revised version of the strategy was made publicly available, and further revisions were 
published in 2009 and 2011 (the latter being the most recent version as of time of writing). 
Elements of resilience strategising can be seen in these four sub-strategies: ‘Protect’ aims to 
target-harden key aspects of national infrastructure such as transport systems and public 
places in order to make them less vulnerable to attack; whereas ‘Prepare’ involves developing 
mitigation plans in the event of an attack in order that the country can quickly recover or 
‘bounce back’. The ‘Pursue’ work stream involves work by the security services in detecting 
or thwarting terror plots, and presumably involves surveillance of particular targets by human 
intelligence (for example undercover agents or informants) and by monitoring suspects’ 
electronic communications (undertaken by the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ), the UK’s signals intelligence agency). 
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Of the four elements of CONTEST, it is the ‘Prevent’ strategy that has proved the most 
controversial. Thomas suggests that “Government has acknowledged that, in the original 
strategy, ‘Prevent’ was the least developed element, and it has subsequently been 
prioritised’.52 The broad aim of Prevent is ‘to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting 
terrorism”.53  Exactly how this was to be achieved has changed over the lifetime of the 
strategy. It has been claimed that, “there is evidence that the Prevent programme has been 
used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain”, 54 
and while this has been officially denied and probably over-states the claim, the strategy has 
not been able to shake off such a perception.  
 
In 2009 a senior police officer noted that the Prevent strategy had recently been revised, and 
commented favourably on the Association of Chief Police Officers’ strategy for policing in 
relation to Prevent, namely that the police should simultaneously “build better engagement 
within the community” and “generate, share and develop community intelligence”.55 Yet the 
two do not sit easily together, and one can imagine that such a strategy may have put 
individual officers in an invidious position, and potentially have eroded community trust in 
the police due to the intelligence-gathering function they also perform. In 2010, the strategy 
was publicly being called into question. One UK newspaper reported that in 2008-9 alone, 
some £140m was spent on a range of general Muslim community activities including giving 
£5,000 to one East London mosque “to provide rap ‘workshops’ and lunches”. Many UK 
mosques received money for sports equipment, various Muslim groups received money, and 
other groups from other religions became unhappy at not receiving similar funding.56 
 
The strategy has continued to attract criticism from various academic authors over the years. 
It is unclear to what extent, if any, such critiques influenced government thinking, but in 
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2010, for example, writing about the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) (‘Prevent’) 
strategy, Thomas summarised ‘four key criticisms’ already made by a number of other 
academics, as follows: 
 
that PVE has had an unhelpful and broad monocultural focus on Muslims; that it has been a vehicle for a 
significant growth in state surveillance of Muslim communities; that PVE in the way it has been designed 
and implemented is contradictory to other key governmental priorities such as community cohesion; and 
that the problematic design of PVE has left progress hobbled by intra-governmental tensions at both 
national and local levels.57 
 
In March 2011 a report commissioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers found that 
Prevent had in fact not damaged police-Muslim community relations.58 However, in May 
2011 Lord Carlile – the then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation – published a 
report addressing some of the issues with the existing Prevent strategy and making 
recommendations as to how it should be reformed,59 and the Government published a revised 
version of the Prevent strategy the following month.60  
 
The policy shift that took place seems have been away from a strategy of trying to fund and 
hence support Muslim voices opposed to extremism and of funding community activities as a 
way of appealing to young Muslims or occupying their time. Instead, greater emphasis would 
be placed on ‘challenging’ extremism and on developing mechanisms, especially within 
publicly funded organisations, by which those ‘at risk’ of ‘radicalisation’ might be identified 
and directed to the multi-agency ‘support’ programme, ‘Channel’. Channel, which is part of 
the Prevent strategy, was piloted in 2007 and introduced across England and Wales in 2012. It 
aims to “[provide] support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable 
to being drawn into terrorism”, by “a. identifying individuals at risk; b. assessing the nature 
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and extent of that risk; and; c. developing the most appropriate support plan for the 
individuals concerned”.61 Referrals to the programme may come from a wide range of public 
organisations, including schools, colleges, universities, social workers, prisons, the NHS, 
youth offending services, probation, and local authorities.62  
 
The Prevent strategy maintains that “[w]e remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom 
of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-
violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology”.63 This commitment appears only 
partial, however, given that ‘extremist’ ideas would seem not to be protected, and given that 
the strategy features mechanisms for identifying particular individuals and intervening. An 
implication of the revised Prevent strategy as a whole is that the object of government 
attention should be not just ‘at risk’ individuals but also particular locations or institutions that 
might be supportive (or at least insufficiently critical) of extremist views. One of the 
objectives of the revised Prevent strategy was to “[w]ork with a wide range of sectors 
(including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are 
risks of radicalisation which we need to address”.64 In recent years, however, one of the ways 
in which the Government has sought to ‘work with’ public sector organisations has been to 
require them to comply with measures designed to identify ‘at risk’ individuals and to restrict 
the possibility of extremist views being expressed within those organisations or of those being 
left unchallenged. With the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, this has become 
formalised as what is now officially referred to as the ‘Prevent duty’ on various public sector 
organisations. 
 
The UK Government’s official guidance on the Prevent duty (to which specified authorities 
are required to ‘have regard’) is careful to avoid language that would suggest that public 
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sector staff should in any way ‘spy’ on or engage in the surveillance of anyone using their 
services, and indeed the obligations seem largely to be sensibly drafted and to formalise what 
in many cases would be common managerial and pastoral practices.65 Nonetheless, there now 
exists a legal duty on named public sector institutions to comply with the law. For example, 
the Prevent Duty Guidance for higher education institutions in Scotland advises that 
institutions “should give relevant staff sufficient training to be able to recognise vulnerability 
to being drawn into terrorism, and be aware of what action to take”.66 
 
Arguably, the effect of the Prevent duty in relation to ‘surveillance’ is twofold. First, the duty 
introduces a legal obligation on public sector staff to be alert to extremist views, to report 
them within formal mechanisms within their organisation, and to follow policies designed to 
restrict the expression of such views; and second, the duty effectively places the institutions 
themselves under suspicion, requiring of them that they put into place certain policies. In 
other words, even if the ‘surveillance’ practices at present appear extremely limited in their 
intensity, the duty does however introduce the principle both that public sector staff should 
undertake a certain surveillance role and that their organisation is itself a potential source of 
threat. The means by which this is to be achieved is reminiscent of public sector 
‘managerialism’67 (in which institutions are required to meet certain objectives but have some 
limited latitude in how to achieve them) and of ‘responsibilisation’68 (in which government 
moves the responsibility for achieving goals onto organisations or individuals). 
 
In relation to schools, non-binding ‘Departmental advice’ was issued in 2015 by the 
Department of Education, explaining what schools need to do to comply with the Prevent 
duty.69 The document suggests that “[s]chools and childcare providers can also build pupils’ 
resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to 
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challenge extremist views”, but that “the Prevent duty is not intended to stop pupils debating 
controversial issues. On the contrary, schools should provide a safe space in which children, 
young people and staff can understand the risks associated with terrorism and develop the 
knowledge and skills to be able to challenge extremist arguments”. 70 In the field of education 
studies, numerous academics have expressed concern about operation, implications and 
consequences of the Prevent strategy. Thomas argues that “rather than trust in broader and 
non-stigmatising processes of anti-extremist education, the police-led Prevent has ‘engaged’ 
with and surveilled young Muslims. Within Prevent there is little evidence of educational 
processes that explicitly build youth resilience against extremism’ and that we are witnessing 
‘a deepening process of education-based surveillance”.71 Pal Sian argues that ‘young Muslims 
have been increasingly subject to scrutinised and systematic forms of disciplining and 
regulation’.72 In relation to education more generally, O’Donnell contends that, ‘A clear set of 
philosophical and ethical principles ought to underpin education, including in prisons, in order 
to preserve its autonomy from security and intelligence agendas’. 73 
 
It is clear that there has been change in the approach and functioning of the Prevent strategies 
over its lifetime, but it is less clear that the changes made have been in response to civil 
liberties concerns. The major changes, in 2011, appear to have been driven instead by 
criticism from the conservative press that the policy was inadvertently and inappropriately 
providing significant financial support for Muslim groups, and that there was insufficient 
attention to the expression of extremist views. The aim of the strategies today includes the 
attempt to make public institutions more challenging towards extremist views, the referral on 
to the Channel programme of those most ‘at risk’, and, in the case of schools, for example, 
increasing children’s ‘resilience’ to ‘radicalisation’. A report by the UK Parliament’s Joint 
Select Committee on Human Rights recently noted that there are some concerns regarding the 
 31 
operation of Prevent in relation to Schools, including possible over-reporting by schools, and 
possible ‘chilling effects’ on Muslim families, though also a lack of reliable empirical 
evidence. The same report noted that “conflicting duties on universities to promote free 
speech, whilst precluding the expression of extremist views, is likely to continue to cause 
confusion”.74 
 
It remains to be seen what the long-term consequences are of systems put in place by the 
Prevent strategy in the UK in the attempt to monitor and prevent the expression of extremist 
views within public institutions and by particular individuals. One possibility is that the 
programme becomes successful at identifying individuals at risk, and at making public 
institutions less accommodating to extremist views, thus diminishing the ability of extremists 
to propagate their ideas. 
 
However, there are various ways in which the surveillance within UK education of extremist 
views could have various consequences detrimental to the public good (understood broadly). 
First, whereas these surveillance measures are introduced in the name of enhancing security, 
an important societal ‘good’, they could have the opposite result. Just as in the field of 
policing practices such as stop and search/frisk may erode the police’s perceived legitimacy 
with those stopped if they perceive the encounter to have been driven by racial factors and 
hence to lack impartiality and to be procedurally unfair,75 so too it is possible that if Muslim 
pupils, students or educators feel the surveillance measures are not directed equally but 
instead specifically target them, so too they may perceive the practice and those that are 
involved in their implementation in a negative light. Moreover, it is further possible that this 
may in turn lead to mechanisms of ‘labelling’, marginalisation or alienation, in which the very 
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people to whom the surveillance is directed become more disenchanted and more receptive to 
processes of ‘radicalisation’. 
 
Second, it is also possible that the imposition of the Prevent duty on educators and other 
public sector professionals and administrators could lead to a long-term erosion of trust in 
them, not only in the eyes of British Muslim pupils and students but also within schools, 
colleges and universities more generally as all participants gain an awareness that there were 
dangers in expressing one’s true views, leading in turn to a ‘chilling effect’ and the decline of 
open debate, a public good. Consequently, there could be a decline in the willingness or 
ability of people to exercise their freedom of expression. Such a development is of particular 
concern to places of learning since discussion and debate are central to the furtherance of 
research and understanding as well as to individual development. 
 
The central issue raised by this case is one to which the answer is as yet unknown, namely 
whether (or to what extent) various liberal-democratic qualities of UK education and the legal 
regime they inhabit remain ‘resilient’ in the face of the challenge posed by UK security 
measures themselves designed to address the resilience of pro-extremist views within certain 
sections of UK society. In particular, it remains to be seen whether a culture of relative 
freedom of expression and political debate that has been a feature of UK higher education, 
along with a sentiment of multicultural tolerance embraced within UK schooling, are able to 
survive in the future should the monitoring processes introduced lead to a chilling effect 
within the classroom or seminar room. Various countervailing forces may resist or otherwise 
exhibit resilience in the face of such a challenge, however, ranging from the profession 
culture within the education profession, to human rights protections afforded by the legal 
system. It is quite possible however that any impacts experienced are distributed unequally, 
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with the education sector as a whole remaining largely unaffected, but specific schools, 
colleges and universities experiencing significant loss of trust between those who are learning 
and teaching. 
 
The surveillance of digital financial transactions  
The global ‘main event’ for the critical understanding of international information 
transactions has undoubtedly been the revelations made in 2013 by Edward Snowden of the 
US’s National Security Agency (NSA) and its associates (e.g., GCHQ) in the mass 
surveillance of communications data. This section of the article does not go over the well-
worn content, issues and aftermath of Snowden’s revelations. It focuses instead on much less 
well-known practices involved in the surveillance of international flows – migration – of 
financial data through two main instruments that have existed for some time: the Belgian-
based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), and the US’ 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), the histories of which intersect in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US targets as their security-related functioning became more 
evident and gave rise to concern and policy conflict. To be sure, among its surveillance 
operations, the NSA has been involved in monitoring information about financial 
transactions. The activities of a third instrument, the France-based Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering (FATF), are also relevant to this account, particularly as its they 
extended to cover the financing of terrorist activities from 2001. Underpinning the 
surveillance of financial transactions lie a range of organisations and operations dedicated to 
financial intelligence-gathering and communication in the contexts of law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism.  
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SWIFT is a co-operative networked company established under Belgian law. It dates from 
1973 as a secure and standardised means by which financial institutions can exchange 
information on financial transactions between their customers. Across the world, most 
transaction messages of this kind go through SWIFT, to which thousands of banks and other 
financial organisations subscribe. SWIFT provides a channel for transaction information (the 
SWIFTNet FIN service), also performing ancillary messaging and management services, and 
does not itself execute transfer orders between institutions. It operates through data centres in 
the Netherlands (for the European zone) and also in the US, where the data are mirrored for 
short-term (124-day) retention. A third centre was established in Switzerland in 2009, since 
when European-zone SWIFT members’ data are no longer duplicated in the US; but 
transatlantic data are held both in the US and the Swiss centre.  
 
Whereas US authorities had unsuccessfully sought access to SWIFT data in the 1990s,76 the 
advent of the TFTP after 9/11 – under the auspices of the US Treasury, the CIA and other US 
agencies – brought results. Newspapers in 2006 dramatically revealed the existence of the 
TFTP and of a secret deal between SWIFT and the US whereby the latter, using subpoenas, 
gained access to SWIFT data held in the US. These data were used for specific searches and 
for the mapping or ‘link analysis’ of networks of suspected persons “without effective and 
clear legal basis and independent controls in line with Belgian and European law”, according 
to the Belgian Data Protection Commission.77 SWIFT’s integrity and the confidence of users 
in the protection of privacy in its services were compromised, and elements of the ‘national 
security v. privacy’ debate were to the fore. Within the EU, the Working Party established 
under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of 1995 expressed its serious 
concern in 2006, emphasising the failure of the SWIFT-US arrangements to comply with 
many of the requirements of the Directive.78 The Working Party strongly criticised SWIFT’s 
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as well as individual financial institutions’ neglect of their legal data protection obligations. 
The years following the 2006 revelations saw negotiations towards a new agreement between 
the EU and the US – concluded in July, 2010 – that established the basis for data transfer to 
the US for TFTP purposes, and included the protection of personal data. The copying of 
SWIFT data to a US centre eventually ceased at the end of 2009, data thenceforward 
remaining within the European zone.  
 
Several other European institutions were also active in criticising the way in which financial 
data were being surreptitiously used, and in developing and scrutinising the proposed 
agreement as they attempted to reach a solution involving safeguards for information privacy 
under data protection regulations. These bodies included the European Commission (EC), the 
European Parliament (EP), and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS); however, 
the Article 29 Working Party complained that it had not been consulted on the draft 
negotiating mandate. Although consensus across its Members was difficult to achieve, the EP 
– similarly displeased by its exclusion from involvement in the EC’s activity towards a new 
agreement – passed a Resolution in September, 2009 with specific demands for stronger 
privacy safeguards and citizens’ rights. While noting that “SWIFT is a key infrastructure for 
the resilience of Europe's payment systems and securities markets”, the EP cited Human 
Rights documents in emphasising equally that “the European Union is based on the rule of 
law and that all transfers of European personal data to third countries for security purposes 
should respect procedural guarantees and defence rights and comply with data-protection 
legislation at national and European level”. Among other aims, it sought legal certainty, 
immunities, and rights of redress for citizens and organisations whose data were transferred, 
and urged that transfers should be targeted and proportionate.79 Across Member States, data 
protection authorities (DPAs) co-ordinated their activities, each seeking information from 
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banking organisations in their countries. The Belgian DPA’s inquiry found that SWIFT had 
been engaged in a “hidden, systematic, massive and long-term violation of the fundamental 
European principles as regards data protection”.80  
 
Before the 2010 agreement had been concluded, the influential EDPS highlighted the question 
whether the TFTP’s use of SWIFT data was necessary and proportionate; whilst it was not in 
a position to determine necessity, it queried the proportionality of bulk transfers of data and 
the proposed 5-year retention. The EDPS recommended instead a procedure for the filtering 
of financial transaction data within the EU before transferring them to the US. 81  The 
agreement provided for bulk transfers but envisaged the formation of a system for extracting 
the data within the EU, thus ending bulk transfers. However, the EC saw this not only as a 
means for transatlantic transfer, but also for benefiting the EU’s Member States by 
establishing a European Terrorist financial tracking systems (TFTS), with consequences for 
EU citizens’ privacy. When the EC proposed this in 2011, the EDPS again objected on the 
grounds of unproven necessity and proportionality, lack of clear procedural (and specifically, 
judicial-control) guarantees surrounding requests for data extraction, the nature of any 
oversight mechanisms, and possible function creep through interoperability with other 
databases.82 
 
In its day, and for several years after, the ‘SWIFT affair’ had repercussions in the EU as well 
as in US-EU relations that resembled in severity those that the Snowden revelations would 
later bring about, and that took their place alongside controversies over passenger name 
records (PNR) and security in transatlantic counter-terrorist effort. Two years later, financial 
data tracking came again into prominence through the Snowden documents, which apparently 
showed how the NSA had been secretly accessing SWIFT’s internal data traffic quite 
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separately from the formal and publicly-agreed mechanisms of the TFTP, and accessing 
credit-card companies’ data as well. The NSA’s Tracfin database and its ‘Follow the Money’ 
branch were also implicated in the affair, according to secret documents in the hands of Der 
Spiegel.83 This led to the EP’s resolution calling on the EC to suspend transfers of TFTP data 
to the US Treasury.84 
 
This account of SWIFT and TFTP provides insights into surveillance issues in and around 
such transactions. Some have argued that the data-analytic techniques used by TFTP 
constitute a ‘security’ rather than a ‘surveillance’ paradigm, insofar as the flow of data is not 
surveyed wholesale but is more closely targeted to reveal and analyse networks of actors of 
interest to law enforcement and counter-terrorism.85 However these practices are interpreted 
and designated, the story of the analysis and use of data on financial transactions also shows 
the threats against which institutional machinery, policies and practices have been developed. 
The main threats are of several kinds: (1) terrorism and its financing through global financial 
transactions; (2) the concomitant threat to the rule of law and to rights from activities 
designed to combat 1, and to combat a third threat as well: (3) other criminal activity, 
including money-laundering and financial fraud.  There was wide but variable consensus on 
the reality of these threats, even among political and regulatory bodies making and enforcing 
policies to regulate the means of combating them, who were often sceptical about the extent 
of some of these dangers and the necessity and proportionality of measures to prevent or 
respond to them.  
 
The ‘SWIFT affair’ also illustrates the dynamics of relationships among various financial, 
governing and regulatory actors. It is noteworthy that the general public as such seems to have 
played a negligible part in the affair as protestors or as actors in political activities and 
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organisations involved in the affair. The EU institutions as well as SWIFT and even the NSA 
purported to act in the interests of the general public, whether the latter are seen as those 
whose interests are at stake in either surveillance/security activities or in the limitation of 
these activities. So, too did certain civil-society groups who were concerned with ensuring 
that the agreements and systems set up for financial surveillance and security did not damage 
rights. But, compared with the public reaction to the Snowden revelations, civil society, the 
general public and even the media were only lightly involved as participants in the affair.  
Some of the institutions of the EU were able to concert their inputs to policy-making, largely 
in reaction to the initiatives of the EC and the Council, and to try to achieve more stringent 
safeguards as well as transparency.  
 
The consequences for important public goods were important in the story of the flow of 
financial information between the EU and the US. Security against terrorism (and financially 
related crime) was seen as strengthened by ensuring the flow of financial tracking 
information. But institutions that championed the rights of citizens and that sought ways of 
keeping those surveillance and security measures within bounds perceived the threat to the 
rule of law and to citizens’ rights if this flow were not carefully regulated. The public goods 
of privacy and the rule of law were seen as strengthened if safeguards could be written into 
transfer agreements and by locating the selection of data and its governance within the EU.  
 
There was also a less frequently discussed threat and public good at stake: the integrity of, and 
trust in, communications and data in financial and banking systems that handle global 
commercial transactions. Integrity and trust may be undermined by terrorists and fraudsters 
who exploit the possibilities afforded by the financial system. Both the security-related 
resilience to the financing of terrorism and crime and the human rights-related resilience to 
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the accessing of personal communications data have to be considered alongside the 
consequences for trust in the financial system’s integrity as a public good, beyond the more 
evident individual good – to which the interests of financial institutions are connected – that 
inheres in the security of individuals’ financial transactions. But this threat to the integrity of 
the global financial system is also posed if its processes are suborned by hidden or even 
publicly agreed processes that, while designed to protect the system and to combat terrorism 
and financial crime, have potentially adverse effects on the public good of trust and 
confidence in financial institutions, in which banking customers have placed their trust that 
information about financial transactions would remain confidential and not become accessible 
by third parties. 
 
Analysis Across Cases  
Ideally, each of these cases would deserve more detailed description and analysis, especially 
in terms of the resilience models we are concerned to develop. However, even in abbreviated 
form all these cases tell us something about the (degree of) resilience of institutions and 
people86 in the face of perceived dangers: ‘extremists’, migrants, and terrorist- (or crime-) 
related flows of financial information. They also afford insights into the (degree of) resilience 
of societies, groups and individuals as they respond to surveillance or, more incidentally, cope 
with perceived non-surveillance threats. The descriptive case studies allowed us to 
disaggregate strategically in order to gain a better grasp of the activities involved in terms of 
the three aspects: the relationships involved in surveillance and in resilience in the face of it; 
the dynamics of the processes of surveillance-and-resilience over time; and the consequences 
of surveillance for the various public goods at stake. Looking comparatively across the cases, 
we address these briefly in turn: 
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Relationships involved in surveillance and in resilience 
In each case there were multiple watchers and watched, and different kinds of institutions or 
organised interests that participated in applying surveillance and in resilient behaviour in the 
face of it. This is not surprising, but it serves to remind us that – in the terms of our abstract 
models and diagrams, the sources of stress or shock may be multiple. Where this is so, it 
would require further disaggregated investigation of the relationships on either side of the 
surveillance/resilience boundary. The ‘stakeholders’ have a multiple, interdependent 
relationship: not only are the stresses and shocks multiple, but so are the resilience responses. 
The migration case showed that the interests of the surveilling parties are also changing, 
sometimes trying to avoid the identification, registration and surveillance of the refugees, thus 
showing signs of political resilience, even resistance towards EU policies. Thus the system is 
constantly shaped by these shifting and interactive factors, initiatives and responses among 
both the watchers and the watched. 
 
Dynamics of the processes of surveillance-and-resilience 
The cases all showed how different groups, organisations and individuals (and their 
relationships) were involved at different phases of the dynamic process over time. The 
point(s) at which those subjected to surveillance perceive the stress/shock and the threat to 
public goods is a crucial element in shaping their behaviour, whether resilience, resistance, or 
some other form.87 In the cases of migration and control of extremist views, precaution or 
prevention were not options for those under surveillance. In the case of financial 
communications, terrorists and fraudsters were likely to be able to anticipate the tracking of 
their transactions, and could attempt to avoid or evade detection of their operations. Such 
resilience, in turn, was foreseen by agencies in their own resilient activities, in which they 
attempted to foreclose the opportunities for unsurveilled transactions by means of a global 
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infrastructure for detecting and disrupting the financing of terrorist activities, financial fraud 
and other criminal behaviour. Similarly, the resilience of counter-terrorism forces was 
manifest in the ‘Prevent’ strategy which, by its very name, indicated an attempt to forestall 
‘extremist’ expression and to put in place an elaborate system for detecting, reporting and 
sanctioning such expression.  
 
Consequences of surveillance for public goods 
Various public goods and the consequences of their erosion through surveillance also were 
evident as among various individuals, groups, societies or institutions that are the subjects of 
surveillance. There may be emergency situations when the realisation of certain public goods 
(and the rights reflecting them) are restricted or even suspended, and surveillance is centrally 
implicated in that; after the emergency has subsided, resilience would imply recovery and 
restoration of these public goods, although it is very likely that, to some degree, the system 
that restricted the rights or public goods will remain as a more or less permanent and 
‘normalised’ feature, as people get used to the restriction and as the vested interests in 
applying surveillance gain strength. The basic set of public goods in a Western society may 
not be changing significantly, but their actual relative importance may change, in particular 
with regard to security. In many political and public-opinion quarters, security as a public 
good has come to be seen as opposed to privacy, usually interpreted as a fundamental right of 
individuals, although there are strong arguments that it should be seen as a public good of 
categorically equal status to security in that both are constitutive of the liberties and freedoms 
enjoyed in liberal democratic societies.88 Privacy is one of the most surveillance-impacted 
public goods in itself, as seen in the cases. Its restriction in other security-related settings in 
turn potentially damages other public goods such as the freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
communication.   
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Conclusion: Future Research Questions  
We conclude with some further brief observations on the cases and on the analysis, with some 
reflections on how they might be further developed. Much more could be done by way of 
analysis of the three situations, and of any others that might be invoked on the descriptive 
plane. The cases illustrate different types of surveillance processes as they occur in 
contemporary terrorism-related situations, although the degree to which these situations 
involve terrorism-related threats differs: migration is only in some small part a source of fears 
about terrorism as such, and has more to do with fears about strangers and their claims upon 
countries’ resources. The geographical spread and choice of cases reflected our knowledge 
and the prominence of the phenomena described, rather than methodological concerns to test 
any hypotheses or to deploy a strategic, systematic, theoretically or conceptually driven 
outlook on surveillance and resilience. Thus the short study of the surveillance of ‘extremist’ 
views was based on the UK; that of migration had to do with Europe and more specifically on 
Central and Eastern Europe; and that of financial transactions related especially to Europe and 
the international or global arena. These differences run the gamut of macro-, meso-, and 
micro-levels of analysis (macro: international and states; meso: a society and its components; 
micro: individuals and intimate groupings) although we have not systematically exploited the 
insights that these categories are likely to afford, or the hypotheses that they are likely to 
generate.   
 
However, in this article we did not explore these analytical opportunities to any extent; nor 
did our case narratives systematically plot actions and reactions against the time dimension 
that we indicated in Figure 1 above, which was derived from the agricultural development 
example provided by Montpellier.89 That diagram sequentially labelled seven phases of a 
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development trajectory, susceptible to stresses and shocks, as ‘anticipate, survey, prevent, 
tolerate, recover, restore, learn’. 90  Although other categories than these might be more 
suitable for disaggregating the time dimension, it would be necessary to re-describe case 
narratives in terms of whatever categorical scheme is used. An advantage of this would be 
greater understanding of the surveillance/resilience complex and its analysis in a variety of 
comparative dimensions, not only geographical ones or at different levels, but also in many 
substantive areas of everyday life.  
 
Another important piece of unfinished business is to highlight the importance of the 
perception of danger, locating it in a temporal dimension and showing its relation to the 
ability to be resilient and to the steps (or leaps) taken to ‘bounce back’. At what time (phase) 
was an ‘extremist’, migration, or terrorist financing threat perceived? Or have these ‘threats’ 
been to some extent manufactured or socially shaped in order to justify surveillance as a 
resilient response by states, societies and organisations? And when, in turn, were the ‘threats’ 
posed by surveillance and the potential damage to public goods (and which ones) perceived, 
and how was that perception shaped? These would be essential avenues to be explored in the 
situation of surveillance and resilience. 
 
This article is but a stage of a longer study in the intersection of surveillance and resilience. It 
is intended for discussion, and we hope it will give rise to new questions and new insights. 
While a central issue is the way in which different groups exhibit degrees of resilience to 
surveillance, our discussion has also noted how this can play into the dynamic of surveiller 
and surveilled, and indeed how ‘resilience’ can be identified in various different elements of 
the analyses and at different societal scales, from the micro to the macro. Such analysis flows 
from the basic premise, namely that the concept of resilience is not limited in applicability to 
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the security state alone, but is a general concept, and one potentially having analytic 
applicability to a range of societal practices. 
 
In addition to suggesting the insights that attending to the notion of resilience can bring to the 
study of societal responses to surveillance, we can indicate how the case studies and analysis 
could contribute to a partial rethinking of the concept or derived model of resilience with 
which this discussion began. In particular, it seems important here to distinguish between 
‘resilience’ as a quality of an entity, and a ‘resilience model’ in which the exhibition of 
resilience by an entity is only one possible outcome (the others including system collapse, for 
example). Even in the former case, the attribution of ‘resilience’ to a system is not 
straightforward, since if resilience can involve recovery from a severe setback caused by a 
major external shock or series of stresses, then whether or not resilience is empirically 
determined to have been exhibited will depend on the time-frame of the subsequent evaluation. 
To explore the applicability of ‘resilience’ to a social system is not necessarily to assume that 
it is necessarily to be found there. In addition, the ambiguities as to what ‘resilience’ might 
involve should also lead us towards circumspection regarding the application of the concept to 
actual empirical states of affairs. Moreover, rather than consider ‘resilience’ exclusively at the 
level of society as a whole, our analysis suggests that it is important for any theory of 
resilience to recognise that at a given point in time different sectors or subsystems of society 
may exhibit (possibly wildly) different degrees of resilience. Having said this, we 
nevertheless contend that there is merit in taking the concept of resilience seriously and in 
exploring its social-scientific applications, not least for the concept’s utility in exploring a 
system or subsystem’s range of adaptive responses over time to challenges of one kind or 
another. 
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Table 1. Three applications of the concept of resilience 
 
1. Resilience of a social 
entity 
2. Resilience of an 
undesired target group 
3. Resilience of public 
goods 
(e.g. individual 
psychological resilience, 
community resilience, 
state resilience) 
(e.g. resilience of a 
terrorist or organised 
criminal network to 
detection or disruption) 
(e.g. resilience of freedom 
of expression in the face of 
state surveillance of 
citizens’ communications) 		
 
 
Figure 1: General model of resilience 
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts two axes: public goods, and time, thus making it clear that (x-axis) 
there is a temporal flow of events and processes, in which different constituent 
elements – such as anticipation, reaction, or learning – pertain to different moments or 
episodes related to the stress(es) or shocks that are at the centre of attention in 
resilience. The y-axis indicates that what are at stake are public goods. Which 
elements and which public goods are implicated is not shown, but would be important 
to identify in more finely grained and empirically informed Figures. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2. Basic resilience model.  
  
 
 
Figure 3. Basic resistance model. 
 
 
 
